Lies, damn lies, sugar, and statistics.

by | Aug 9, 2013 | Social Commentary | 0 comments

Of course I’m interested in sugar, and particularly how much my boys consume. I’m long since convinced that it’s likely to do me, and them, more harm than fat. But there I go in what for me is a greater interest: it’s the ‘likely’ bit – the extent to which any of this is reasonably certain, or not, as the case may be. Alex Renton does a good job of articulating the issues about sugar in “The Demon Drink”,  but for someone whose been doing a lot of work on ‘data’ recently (in preparation for a presentation at the Federation for Detached Youth Work’s annual conference in November entitled “Detached Youth Work in an era of Big Data”) I’m not sure it helped me much. A bit nerdy I know but I ended up counting his use of related terms. There were six uses of the word ‘may’, one ‘perhaps’, one ‘expected’, one ‘believes’ (in preference perhaps to ‘know’), one ‘probably’, one ‘can’ (in preference perhaps to ‘will’) and one equally ambiguous ‘the charge is’. In sum (isn’t that the point about the floating concept of data – it’s become something measurable and quantifiable?) what reads as something certain is anything but.

I repeat again, I’m convinced about sugar, but I’m fascinated more by uncertainty and the extent to which political and economic cultures are increasingly informed by the, so-called, predictive sciences. Doubtless, there’s something of the spectre of litigation that see journalists self-censoring when it comes to a whole range of sensitive and controversial issues. And whilst this is probably a good thing [see I’m infected by these language games also] there’s certainly a down-side; science is denigrated through the language of scienticism. Renton refers to ‘Cod Science’ (is this a derivative of ‘cods wallop’, implying bullshit, or something more to do with things being simply popular?). He quotes David Colquhon’s Improbable Science blog as its scourge, where Colquhon says: “Bugger all is known with certainty about the effects of diet on health. That’s why so much is written about it. The whole problem is that it’s all correlational stuff – there’s no causality proven.” But how does this help those wishing to make informed decisions as they make their way in the world? What do we know, and what don’t we know?

I can hear Donald Rumsfeld somewhere in the background. I prided myself in thinking that what he said was reasonable but continue to remind myself that he, like other proponents of this ‘language’ regard it primarily as a tool for politics. Lynton Crosby has to get a mention here in his smooth talking, which masquerades for what others call ‘wedge’ and ‘dog-whistle’ politics. My preference is for Ray Tallis. He fleshes out scienticism in Aping Mankind: the use of language that purports to be science in order to convince people of an argument’s veracity. Tallis’s tome cannot be seen in the same light as a surfeit of recent books on this theme. From The Norm Chronicles to Nate Silver’s The Signal and the Noise: The Art and Science of Prediction, despite arguments to the contrary therein, the psychological moves made seem to validate the idea that pretty much all can be predicted.

Closer to home for me, especially in the youth social work I’m interested in, I continue to be haunted by the statement that got me interested in all this. Page 1 of the 2008 Youth Crime Action Plan contained the bold as brash statement: “Increasingly we know how to identify these young people early on – in particular how they tend to come from a small number of vulnerable families …”. I can remember feeling the blood drain out of me on the basis that we were now entering a new era of politics that really did believe it could predict the future. In this case, confidently asserting who would go on to live a life of crime.

Forays into the literature on risk, and even epidemiology, consolidated my sense that we should all just hang-on a little bit and think this through. Certainly I concluded we were living in extraordinary times. I went on to conceptualise ‘at riskism’ as the new prejudice, an idea that met with a resigned nod amongst the many youth workers and social workers I have presented it to. I challenged them to think on as to how many social policies are affected in this way. Consider the ‘criteria’ for being a ‘Troubled Family’? And the validation of increased ‘early intervention’ based on ‘at risk factors’. Whilst Nudge theories were in their ascendancy during this period the same Action Plan, and the numerous policy documents it seemed to spawn, went further, impelling workers to engage in ‘assertive outreach’ and ‘offer non-negotiable support’ – as if such a thing could ever, reasonably, be regarded as an offer.

This confidence in knowing the future is big business. Consider Obama’s $100m Brain Science Project and investment in predictive policing (has there ever been a better self-fulfilling prophecy?). But maybe politicians are even getting tired with this, and having to defend their arguments at all, whether with science, scienticism, or spurious evidence. IDS, when challenged on Radio 4 recently to provide an evidence base or some such other rationale for his welfare reform policies, felt a logical fallacy was sufficient. The sooner Gove puts philosophy on the curriculum the better, me thinks. Shifting the burden of proof won’t wash in this game; it can never be reasonable to argue, as IDS did, “you can’t disprove what I say.” As if something is reasonably believed until such time as evidence refutes it. ‘tis the onward march of ‘evidence-free policy’, as Polly Toynbee has coined it.

The Norm Chronicles’ authors, Blastland and Spiegelhalter, do at least give us some examples of where we can lose all reasonableness when it comes to considering risk and chance, therein reminding us of the uncertainties. Personally, I’d want to take a qualitative, rather than quantitative, view of uncertainty. Perhaps we might value these uncertainties more highly. They might do us more good than harm, in that they impel us to distinguish between science and philosophy (or ideology) and engage democratically with one another in the social practices of ethical debate and critical enquiry. So much, it seems to me at least, is better dealt with by thinking through what we should do rather than kowtowing to what politically-motivated scienticism claims as the blindingly obvious.

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